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film/tv

ond, James Bond. We know the name well.
We should; he is one of America's most famous fictional characters.

Like

Mickey Mouse, Superman, and Bugs Bunny, James Bond - although of British
origin - has become a national treasure, a "voice[ ] of American assurance, the
best America has to offer, and carr[ies] a certain sense of history."1 So imagine
if suddenly James Bond were to appear in a different movie every year, portrayed
each time by a different actor. Not Connery, Moore, or Brosnan -

or even Dalton,

Le Protection of James Bond
_d Other Fictional Characters
-iderthe Federal Trademark
1ution Act By Kristen Knudsen
for that matter. Instead, imagine James Bond portrayed by Robin Williams one
year and Jim Carrey the next. Perhaps, too, you would see the suave secret agent
in a new TV show, embroiled in a new international intrigue week after week.
Soon, he would become an advertising spokesperson, pitching cars, beer, or toilet paper.

If all this were to happen, you might be shaken, even stirred.

Fortunately, a limited copyright term protects James Bond from this unseemly fate.

But what will happen when the copyright expires? 2

The Federal

3
Trademark Dilution Act may provide the necessary additional protection.

A

number of different protections
are available for fictional characters
4
under intellectual property law.

"property right" in a character, serv-

These have traditionally included

This argument stems from the fact
that federal dilution protection can
be invoked to protect the trademark

copyright, trademark, and unfair
competition, or some combination
thereof. 5 Another avenue of protection can be found in state dilution

ing to protect an owner's investment
14
rather than protect consumers.

right in Mickey Mouse had been set
to expire in 2003.19 With this Act,
Congress broadened copyright's limited term and ensured that Mickey
would continue to receive the most
intellectual property
protection

owner even where consumers are not
likely to be confused by the use. 15 In
this way, the Dilution Act does create
a sort of property right which favors

available until 2023.20 Once the new
copyright terms expire, Congress

the trademark owner's interest in
the advertising value of his mark

even further. But legislators did not
have to stretch the copyright law to

one source, or by "tarnishing" their
commercial value. 6 This harm may

over the more honorable goal of pre16
venting public confusion.

protect Mickey Mouse. The protection
characters need is already in place.

occur even where there is no likelihood of public confusion, and even

It is precisely because of their
meaning to society, however, that
some characters need protection

The Federal Trademark Dilution
Act strengthens existing protection
by preventing others from using

copyright
term.
beyond
the
Furthermore, the limited property
right created by federal dilution

famous characters, even where no
likelihood of confusion exists. This

allows trademark owners to prevent
loss of their characters to the public

sion of our cultural icons, a public
policy validated by both Congress
and the courts. This Note explores
the traditional modes of protection

statutes, which prohibit unauthorized uses of characters that could
harm their reputations, such as by
"blurring" their ability to indicate

where the use is on a noncompeting
good. 7 Many commentators have
criticized state dilution theories,
however, as contravening the purposes of the federal copyright law,
which grants protection for limited
terms only 8 then surrenders charac9
ters to the public domain.
At least as a protection for characters, state dilution claims have been
largely unsuccessful. 10 Indeed, in
1992, one commentator pointed to

Were James Bond, for
domain.
example, appropriated to sell a variety of household products, he might
disappear as we know him. Rare
characters like James Bond are
national treasures; as such they

Congressional refusal to add a dilution amendment to the Lanham
Federal Trademark Act as evidence

should not be free for all to use. The
property right conferred by dilution
protection guards these characters, pre-

that Congress did not wish to provide
this additional protection to charac-

serving them for society's enjoyment.

ters. 1 1 Just four years later, howev-

Both the courts and Congress have
endorsed safeguards for certain characters. Despite the rule that upon
expiration of a copyright a character
shall enter the public domain, courts
have long allowed ongoing trademark rights which prevent others
from using some characters. 17 In

er, on January 16, 1996, Congress
changed its course and passed the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of
1995.12 With this, a star was born:
The dilution argument suddenly
became a serious option for character protection.
Because this added protection can
override copyright law and permanently remove certain characters
from the public domain, some schol13
ars are critical of this change.
Some critics also oppose dilution protection because it seems to create a

addition, Congress recently passed
the Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act of 1998 to lengthen
18
copyright protection by 20 years.
Though applicable to all types of
copyrights, this Act was of particular
importance to Disney, whose copy14 ., .. . ..

may again be bombarded by lobbying
efforts to extend copyright protection

benefits the public by preventing ero-

for fictional characters

and why

these are inadequate in protecting
some characters.
The Note then
explores federal dilution as a new
alternative, concluding that this added
protection is needed in special cases.

DIFFERENT FORMS OF
CHARACTER PROTECTION
The qualities of characters "single
them out as the sole fertile ground
for converging intellectual property
theories." 2 1 Both literary and pictorial characters function uniquely as
expressive works and indicators of
source simultaneously. 22 Independent characters appear today most
23
commonly in television and movies.
Continuing series, such as The
Practice and Will & Grace, in which
characters appear week after week in
different adventures, are a staple of
TV. 2 4 Also common are sequels, such

comer might so closely
imitate Sir Toby Belch or
Malvolio as to infringe,

as Scream 3, and spinoffs, such
as Frasier, in which characters
from an earlier work are used
25
again in a new scenario.

be perceived, reproduced, or other-

Copyright

other audiovisual works. 34 The characters depicted in these works may
be protected independently of a

ters he cast a riotous
knight who kept wassail to
the discomfort of the house-

story's plot, 3 5 however, Judge
Learned Hand has explained:
If Twelfth Night were

hold, or a vain and foppish
who
became
steward
of
his
mistress.
amorous
These would be no more
than Shakespeare's "ideas"

opyright protection extends to
some fictional characters as creative
26

The federal copyright law
works.
(along with the federal patent law) is
authorized by the Constitution,
which enables Congress "to promote
the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective
The
Writings and Discoveries." 2 7
introductory clause of this provision
suggests the primary purpose of the
copyright law: to promote the
progress of science and useful arts.
This purpose has been read beyond
the confines of an author's reward, to
more broadly encourage individual
28
effort in advancing public welfare.
As the Supreme Court has explained,
"The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for
an author's creative labor. But the
ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to
stimulate artistic creativity for the
general public good. ' 29 The copyright system thus strikes a bargain
with artists, granting a limited copyright monopoly on creative works for
the purpose of encouraging artistic
expression in return. Implicit in this
exchange is that without the public
benefit gained by continuing artistic
expression, the copyright monopoly
30
would not be justified.
he Copyright Act's protection
"subsists" in "original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression, now known or
later developed, from which they can

wise communicated

.

"31

Among

other things, copyright protection
extends to literary works, 32 dramatic
works, 33 and motion pictures and

copyrighted, it is quite
possible that a second

but it would not be enough
that for one of his charac-

in the play, as little capable
of monopoly as Einstein's
Doctrine of Relativity, or
Darwin's theory of the
Origin of Species. It follows
that the less developed the
characters, the less they
can be copyrighted; that is
the

penalty

an

author

must bear for marking
36
them too indistinctly.
In explaining character protection,
Learned Hand relied on the fundamental principle of copyright law
that ideas themselves will not be protected, only the expression of those
ideas. 3 7 To hold otherwise would
remove basic ideas, such as the "vain
and foppish steward" Judge Hand
mentions, from the public domain.
In order to be protected as expression, a character will need to be more
than a generic, stock character, such
as the "do-good superhero." On the
contrary, a character must be a clearly-defined expression of an artistic
vision, such as a do-good superhero
from the planet Krypton who works
as a reporter at the Daily Planet by

and spinoffs, once the copyright in
the first work expires 4 1 and that
work enters the public domain, continuing copyright protection in later
works from the series will not prevent others from copying a character
based on the first work. 4 2 For example, in Silverman v. CBS. Inc., 4 3 the
court permitted a Broadway musical
producer to use delineations of the

A trademark is any word, name,
symbol, or device which identifies
goods and distinguishes them from
the goods of others by indicating a

Therefore, only "the increments of
expression" added by newer, stillcopyrighted material remain protect-

single source of the goods, even if
that source is unknown to the con-

ed. 4 5 Distinguishing between characteristics in the public domain, however, and those still protected by
copyright, is a difficult determination
that may force courts into "aesthetic
disputes which by and large they are
ill equipped to rule on as a matter of
law."4 6 For this reason, one commentator has suggested that series
characters may be better protected
47
under trademark law.

ciently well-developed and distinctive to deserve protection, visual
characters are easier to protect than
literary ones. 38 One reason may be

Characters may be protected under
the federal trademark law if they
indicate the creative source from

enjoys greater copyright protection
than the noblest human characters
40
of a Hemingway or Faulkner."
In ongoing series such as sequels

sumer. 53 To indicate source, a mark
must be inherently distinctive or
have attained secondary meaning,
such that it has become distinctive of
the goods in commerce. 5 4 To achieve
"secondary meaning," the public
must have come to recognize that the
mark refers to products from a
unique source. 55 To be used "in commerce," and thus trigger federal regulation, the mark must be involved
in commercial transactions across
state lines. 56

Trademark

visual features needed to prove this
claim. Thus, it is "precisely because
of the objective differences between
visual and verbal media, that the
most puerile cartoon animal rightly

Trademarks also serve as objective
symbols of goodwill, representing
and reinforcing the consumer satis52
faction a business has earned.

AMOS 'N' ANDY characters contained in public domain scripts, but
not those delineations given in
44
scripts still protected by copyright.

day. Since the inquiry usually focuses on whether the character is suffi-

that copyright infringement requires
a substantial similarity to the copyrighted work; 3 9 a literary character
like Hamlet lacks the unvarying

that all goods bearing the trademark
come from a single source; (3) signify
that all goods bearing the trademark
share an equal level of quality; and (4)
act as primary instruments in adver51
tising and selling the goods.

Trademark
which they spring. 48
protection is derived from the
the
of
Clause
Commerce
provides,
which
Constitution,
"Congress shall have the Power . . .
To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian
Tribes." 4 9 Like the copyright system,
trademark protection has been justified
as providing a public benefit. 50 Indeed,
trademarks function to (1) identify one
seller's goods and distinguish them
from the goods of others; (2) signify

The eligibility and strength of
trademark protection depends on
where a particular mark falls on the
distinctiveness. 5 7
of
spectrum
Marks range in strength from
"generic" to "arbitrary and fanciful,"
with "descriptive" and "suggestive"
marks in between. 58 A generic term,
such as "orange juice," is one that
refers to the genus to which a product belongs, and is never protectible
by a trademark. 59 A term which is
merely descriptive, such as "purepremium" for orange juice, may not
be protected unless it has attained
Suggestive
secondary meaning. 60
marks, such as "Sunny Delight" for
orange juice, are more than descrip-

tive because they require some imagination in evoking the nature of the

tects registered and unregistered
69
trademarks from infringement.

goods, but they are not quite arbitrary.6 1 If a term is suggestive, it is

State dilution law, a remedy recognized by about half of the states,
has also occasionally been used for

entitled to protection without proof of
secondary meaning. Finally, arbitrary marks, such as "Minute Maid"
for orange juice, are purely abstract
and distinctive creations without
apparent connection to the product;
these are afforded the greatest protection. 6 2 Before the passage of the
Federal Dilution Act, protection
under trademark law meant protection only from infringement. The
infringement analysis requires a
finding of "likelihood of confusion,"
meaning that consumers will likely
be confused by use of a mark too sim63
ilar to an established mark.

Other Protections
Characters have also been protected under principles of unfair competition law. 64 Unfair competition is a
broad category of business tort that
includes passing off; false advertising; misrepresentations about a
product; and disparagement of a
competitor's goods, property, or reputation. 6 5 In all of these, "there is
involved the element of fraudulent
attempt of some one to 'reap where
he has not sown' and to appropriate
to himself 'the harvest of those who
have sown."' 66 In the case of characters, passing off can occur when a
competitor copies distinctive features
of a character's appearance in order
to mislead the public into thinking
that defendant's character was created by the plaintiff. 67 Unfair competition law stems from the common law
of the states. 68 It has been enacted
at the federal level, too, by § 43(a) of
the Lanham Trademark Act, which
prohibits false advertising and pro-

70

character protection.
Most of the
states that accept the doctrine have
enacted statutes based on the Model
State Trademark Bill, which provides that injury to the business reputation of a company or the distincA

ft

I ice a violation of

/

f4he Act "triggers

1995, 28 states recognized dilution as
a legal wrong. 7 4
Many states
required a showing of likelihood of
confusion to find dilution. 7 5 Others
required that the parties not be competitors. 7 6 As a matter of authority
and enforcement, courts could not
77
extend relief beyond state borders.
Due to these inconsistent and unsettled doctrines, state courts largely
ignored dilution claims, often tacking
them onto the end of their opinions
as dicta for decisions reached on
other grounds. 7 8 In cases where
dilution was found and characters

i relief'
g r

were at issue, those characters were
very well-known, and the court usually supplemented its ruling by find-

py;y mark must be

ing a likelihood of confusion under
79
trademark law.

eA t

<*4 ecially
i

famous to

iierit protection.

tive quality of a mark "shall be a
ground for injunctive relief notwithstanding the absence of competition
between the parties or the absence of
confusion as to the source of goods
or services." 7 1 As discussed below,
however, state dilution statutes
offer only thin and inconsistent
character protection.

HIISIRX )F

LU I)N

Dilution is generally traced to a
1927 HARVARD LAW REVIEW article by
Frank I. Schechter. 72 In this article,
Schechter explained that protection
was needed to guard against the
"gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the
public mind of the mark or name by
'7 3
its use upon non-competing goods.
Prior to the Federal Dilution Act of
17

In 1977, the New York Court of
Appeals showed renewed interest in
dilution, finding a protectible interest against the "cancer-like growth of
dissimilar products or services which
feeds upon the business reputation"
of an established trademark.8 0 But
other states continued to gloss over
these claims and interest soon waned
again.8 1 Perceiving the flaws of the
state dilution schemes, the U.S.
8 2
Trademark Review Commission
met in the late 1980s to discuss the
advantages and disadvantages of a
federal dilution law.8 3 A dilution
amendment to the 1988 Trademark
Law Revision Act was proposed but
ultimately dropped due to First
Amendment questions voiced by
broadcasting, advertising, and publishing industries; these media were
concerned that a dilution provision
would prevent parodies and other
journalistic uses. 8 4 One commentator has also suggested that the
amendment was dropped due to the
"political horse-trading" of Congres-
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(G) the nature and extent
of use of the same or similar marks by third parties;
and
(H) whether the mark was
registered under the Act of
March 3, 1881, or the Act
of February 20, 1905, or on
the principal register.102
The statute makes clear that a
court may consider these factors, but
none is determinative. For example,
factor (H) considers whether or not
the mark is registered under the
10 3

Lanham Act.
Since registration
implies some level of distinctiveness,
this could help in proving fame, but is
10 4
not required for dilution protection.
The Act also clarified the raeaning
of dilution. Section 45 now d ?fines it
as "the lessening of the capacity of a
famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of
the presence or absence of-(1) competition between the owner of the
famous mark and other parties, or (2)
likelihood of confusion, mistake, or
deception." 105 This departs significantly from traditional trademark
protection because it does not rely
upon the traditional test of "likelihood of confusion" to grant relief.
While in many cases consumer confusion will be present, 10 6 federal
dilution does not require it, making
dilution a separate and distinct
cause of action under trademark
law. Additionally, dilution protection may be granted against either
competing or non-competing products using the mark.

U nder

law or a state dilution statute. 10 7
The legislative history of the Act
reveals that it is not intended to preempt state dilution statutes, however; 108 separate state and federal
claims may still be brought in the
same case. 10 9 In practice, the ability
to bring concurrent claims will likely
only retain importance in cases of
locally famous marks.1 1 0
Dilution may occur by blurring or
tarnishment.
"Blurring" occurs
when unauthorized use of a mark
"reduces the public's perception that
the mark signifies something unique,
singular, or particular."1 1 1
For
example, the use of TIFFANY hot
dogs, TIFFANY limousines, or
TIFFANY pantyhose would threaten
the ability of the TIFFANY trademark to solely identify the jewelry
store.1 12
While some courts still
require a showing that consumers
are confused or actually harmed, the
blurring analysis should be doctrinally independent.1 1 3 "Tarnishment" involves unauthorized use of a
mark on inferior or offensive products, such that positive associations
of the mark are degraded. 1 14 In an
early state tarnishment case, for
example, ENJOY COCAINE on a
poster was found to tarnish the
1 15
trademark ENJOY COCA-COLA.
Tarnishment differs from parody in
that parody involves "the use of some
elements of a prior author's composition to create a new one that, at least
in part, comments on that author's
works." 1 16
Tarnishment, on the
other hand, degrades a trademark by
causing the public to associate the
11 7
two sources of the products.

§ 43(c)(3), federal trade-

mark registration shall be a "complete bar" to an action brought by
another person under the common

BONI), JAIES BOND

Sony Corp. 11 8 indicates how broad
the new federal dilution protection
can be for film and television characters.
In that case, the plaintiff
Danjaq, with its production partner
MGM Studios, sought a preliminary
injunction against the defendants
Sony Corporation and others, based
on the defendants' plans to make a
series of JAMES BOND movies. 119
Plaintiff Danjaq claimed to be author
Ian Fleming's exclusive assignee of
all U.S. film and TV rights in the
JAMES BOND character. 120
The
defendants countered that their affiliated
writer-producer
Kevin
McClory, who made the Bond films
Thunderball (1965) and Never Say
Never Again (1983), had acquired the
rights in the JAMES BOND character from author Ian Fleming prior to
121
Danjaq and MGM.
The court found that McClory's
copyright had expired, leaving
Danjaq as the sole owner of the copyright and the trademark in the
JAMES BOND character. 1 22
It
granted an injunction based on copyright and trademark infringement,
123
as well as trademark dilution.
The court found that Sony's use of
the JAMES BOND mark would violate the federal dilution statute and
likely create dilution through "blurring," as consumers would associate
defendants' Bond film with the
"identity
and
reputation"
of
12 4
Danjaq's Bond films.
Although the case ultimately settled, 12 5 it represents the revolutionary recognition of federal dilution as
a separate and distinct cause of
action for the protection of film and
TV characters. In Dan'a, the court
ultimately found copyright infringement, and did not decide whether the

The 1998 case of Danjaq LLC v.

plaintiff could have prevailed on

dilution grounds alone. In future
cases, however, where no copyright
infringement exists, it appears that
the doctrine could now stand alone to
protect certain characters.
In another recent case, Brown v.
It's Entertainment. Inc., 1 26 the cartoon character ARTHUR was protected under the federal dilution
statute from unauthorized use.
ARTHUR, a cartoon aardvark, is the
subject of over 60 best-selling books
television
highly-rated
He appeared on the cover
series.
of FAO Schwarz's 1998 holiday catalog, and an ARTHUR balloon led the
and

a

1 27

1997 Macy's Thanksgiving Day
Parade. 12 8 On these facts, the court
found the ARTHUR character was
famous enough to warrant protection
from defendant's use of an unlicensed ARTHUR costume at a toy
12 9

The court reastore opening.
soned, "Should unauthorized Arthur
impersonators proliferate

. .

.

the

image sought by plaintiffs for Arthur
will be difficult to control and might
easily become blurred or tarnished,
resulting in a loss of credibility, public
130
affection, and consumer interest."'
As these cases illustrate, although
reserved for a rarefied class of marks,
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
provides the broadest trademark proIt ensures that
tection possible.
famous fictional characters will not
be pressed into undignified service or
cloned by copiers. As one leading
commentator noted, the Act was "a
major breakthrough for an elite category of trademark owners, and dilu13 1
tion protection now has teeth."

CRITICISMI

F DILUION

The Property Right
Decisions like Daniap make oppo-

nents of dilution nervous. It has
been said that the furthest extensions of trademark rights have come
in the area of preventing unauthorized uses of characters. 13 2 Dilution
extends that far reach even further.
The First Amendment concerns
voiced in 1988 should be calmed, at
least, as § 43(c)(4) exempts fair use,
noncommercial use, and news reporting. 133 In addition, parody is permissible under the Act. 134 Other
concerns remain, however. One contention is that dilution creates a
property right in trademarks, similar
to a trespass action.
Critics argue that rather than furthering the lofty goal of preventing
public confusion, dilution protects
only the narrow private interest of
1 35
those who own famous marks.
After all, this broad provision could
support a "widespread ban on unauthorized uses even if the public is not
in danger of being misled." 13 6 This
undermines the traditional view of
trademark protection as preventing
a tort against the public, not a tres13 7
pass onto the trademark itself.
The Supreme Court has stated:
The law of unfair competition has its roots in the
common law tort of deceit:
its general concern is with
protecting consumers from
confusion as to source.
While that concern may
result in the creation of
"quasi-property rights" in
communicative symbols,
the focus is on the protection of consumers, not the
protection of producers as
an incentive to product
innovation. 138
This "quasi-property"
trademark

theory of

protection historically
2,0..

. ..

..

.

has been limited to the symbolic
The
nature of a trademark. 1 39
Supreme Court has explained that a
trademark is a property right "only
in the sense that a man's right to the
continued enjoyment of his trade reputation and the good-will that flows
from it, free from unwarranted interference by others, is a property right,
for the protection of which a trade140
mark is an instrumentality."'
Granting owners quasi-property status thus has always been accepted as
the price paid for the protection of
the public from confusion.
Critics are correct that the property right conferred by the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act does not
protect the public from confusion, but
it does protect the public in another
way. According to the legislative history of the Act, "The concept of dilution recognizes the substantial
investment and aura of the mark
itself, protecting both from those who
would appropriate the mark for their
Unlike confusion,
own gain." 14 1
which can immediately harm the
public, dilution harms the public in a
more gradual way, slowly dissipating
the public perception of the mark as
something unique. 1 42 The property
right created by the dilution doctrine
prevents such erosion.
In this way, anti-dilution meaFor
sures do protect the public.
trademarks
famous
example, very
like OREO and COCA-COLA have,
like James Bond, become cultural
icons. If an unauthorized user were
to use those marks on inferior or
even just different products, the significance of those marks would be
blurred

or

tarnished

among

American consumers, thus corroding
the goodwill in those marks and
making it harder for consumers to

identify which product they want.
Such national upset was seen in 1985
when Coca-Cola "diluted" its own
mark with the introduction of "New
Coke." 14 3 Although 61 percent of the
people actually preferred New Coke
in blind taste tests, the public revolted. 14 4 When the public uproar forced

source. 14 8

Commentators complain
that this perpetual grant "nullifies
the balance struck between copyright's broad protection and limited

extension of the copyright term since
the current Copyright Act was enacted in 1976.153 The first copyright
law, passed in 1790, granted protec-

duration of exclusivity and trademark's narrow protection but unlimited duration of protection." 14 9 This
is a valid concern to be sure, but

tion for 14 years, plus a 14-year
renewal term. 15 4 In 1831, the initial
term was extended to 28 years, with
a 14-year renewal; this renewal term
was extended to 28 years in 1909.155

the reintroduction of "Coke Classic"
just three months later, Brian C.
Dyson, then senior vice president of
Coca-Cola Company, admitted at a
news conference, "We did not read the

courts have long held that trademark
and copyright regimes may safely
coexist 150 and the Copyright Act

deep emotional ties that people had to
14 5
the whole concept of Coca-Cola."
While not a classic case of dilution
because no unauthorized use was

Lh such characters,

involved, this example is still
instructive for two reasons. First,
it demonstrates that a diluting use
need not be by an inferior prod-

h source is "'hard

uct- any difference in the quality
associated with the mark, be it better or worse, can harm the trademark's value. Second, it illustrates
the emotional significance that the
consuming public attaches to some
It is
very famous trademarks.
that
trademarks
special
these very
the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act seeks to protect.

Undermining Copyright

ose association

,ed' into the public
isciousness,"
tinguishing
guage may not be
)ugh to prevent
ofthose
lemarks.

D ilution has

also been criticized
as undermining the public policy of
the copyright law. The primary purpose of copyright is to promote creativity and dissemination of creative
works, so that the public may benefit
from the labor of authors. 14 6 To that
end, copyright grants a limited duration of protection, after which creative works enter the public
domain. 1 47 Trademark protection,
on the other hand, can be permanent.
A trademark will be protected for as
long as it continues to indicate

itself, in § 301, states that it will not
other federal law. 15 1
preempt
Moreover, Congress has recently
indicated through the Copyright
Term Extension Act that some characters simply do not belong in the
public domain.
The Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act, enacted on October
27, 1998, extended copyright protection by 20 years in all copyrighted
works not already in the public
This marks the first
domain. 1 52
21

In

1976, the renewal

term was

extended to 47 years for works created before January 1, 1978, and any
works created after that date
received a copyright term of the life
of the author plus 50 years. 1 56 The
Copyright Term Extension Act
amended various sections of the 1976
Act to make its renewal term 67
years; and its term of protection for
post-1978 works the length of the
author's life plus 70 years. 157 With
this, Congress has extended copyright
protection to its greatest length yet.
The legislative history of the
Copyright Term Extension Act
reveals it was enacted to bring the
United States in line with European
Union countries, which in 1995
extended copyright protection to the
life of the author plus 70 years.1 58
Matching

the

protection

of the

European Union means that United
States works will be protected for the
same amount of time as European
works, ensuring that U.S. authors
will receive the profits generated
from the sale of their works
abroad. 15 9 The House Report also
identifies as a benefit that the extension of copyright protection will
encourage U.S. authors to create new
works and to restore older works for
dissemination to the public.160
I n addition to these benefits, there
was another unstated benefit to particular copyright holders that
Congress almost certainly consid-

ered. Walt Disney and other entertainment companies led lobbying
efforts in support of the Act, ultimately donating $342,000 to the
16 1
major political parties involved.
Their motive was clear: Disney's

The Act gave them 20 more years of
protection,
prompting
Disney
President Michael Eisner to write
in a letter to shareholders: "Toward
the end of the year 1998, action was
taken in Washington that should

Disney's copyright expires, Six Flags
Amusement Parks starts using
Mickey Mouse in its advertisements,
perhaps depicting Mickey enjoying

copyrights in many of its famous
characters, including Mickey Mouse,

help us further protect and build on
16 7
our heritage."

small written disclaimer explaining
that Disney in no way endorsed it.

would have expired starting in
2003.162 Additionally, Disney had
recently purchased rights in the
Winnie the Pooh character, a purchase contingent on an extension of
copyright as Winnie's copyright was
also soon to expire. 16 3 This would
have happened "just as the potential
for new uses of characters . . . is
expanding with new markets

on

digital television, cable services and
164
the Internet."
In part, the Copyright Term
Extension
Act
indicates
that
Congress assumed the public would
benefit more from Disney's continued
marketing efforts of such characters
than from free access to these char1 65
acters on media like the Internet.

Scholars criticize this extension
for the same reason they criticize federal dilution protection: it undermines the Constitutional guarantee
that creative works shall be protected for "limited times." 16 8 One federal judge has already ruled, however,
that the Copyright Term Extension
Act does not violate the Constitution,
as Congress has the discretion to
define "limited times." 16 9 One wonders what will happen in 2023, however, when Disney's new extended
copyright in Mickey Mouse will
expire. Disney will likely lobby again
for an extension of the copyright
term. Congress may, again, grant it.
A better solution would be to consider

One commentator notes:
With only five years before
the first Mickey fell into
the public domain, the pub-

the protection of characters already
provided by the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act.

lic's interest in free access

WHY CHARACTERS NEED
DILUTION PROTECTION

to great works of fiction
and non-fiction would necessarily take second place
to the government's interest in Disney's continued
economic health. Congress
has clearly chosen how to
set the balance between
the rights of the copyright
creators and the public's
interest. 166
Indeed, with the Copyright Term
Extension Act, Congress suggests
that Mickey Mouse and friends do
not belong in the public domain.

himself on one of Six Flags' rides.
Perhaps, too, the ad would contain a

While comparative advertising and
parody are permissible under the
dilution amendment, this use probably would not fall into those categories. Moreover, depending on the
context, the public may not be confused; indeed, given the disclaimer,
they may be able to discern that Disney
is not in fact sponsoring the ads.
Without a likelihood of confusion,
there is no trademark infringement,
and Six Flags is able to free ride on
the very famous Mickey Mouse character and all of the goodwill that follows, in order to benefit its own competing theme park. If someone were
to later have an unpleasant visit to
Six Flags, or even just a different
experience than at Disney World, then
the positive images and feelings associated with Mickey Mouse might sour.
Dilution prevents such erosion and
protects the goodwill in Mickey that
Disney has worked years to create.

Marketing Concerns
Protection of Goodwill
Besides protection of goodwill,

Fr

logical as well as emotional

reasons, characters are well-served
by dilution protection. Certain characters, like Mickey Mouse, may cease
to exist if given to the public for unrestricted use. 170 With such characters, whose association with source is
'hard wired' into the public consciousness," distinguishing language
may not be enough to prevent dilution of those trademarks. 17 1 For
example, imagine that in 2023 when
22 --------..

characters also need special protection for other reasons. First, with
the explosion of electronic commerce,
a diluting mark "can gain public
recognition and begin sapping the
commercial strength of a famous
mark practically overnight."'172 Once
on the Internet, a character may be
viewed by millions within a few minutes. 1 73

Furthermore, anyone can

alter or appropriate the character for
his own use without the trademark

owner's knowledge. 1 74 This means
that a diluting use can blur or tarnish a trademark's value both quickly and vastly. Second, due to the fre-

ets of small businesses and ordinary
180
citizens across the United States."
Montan also urged Congress to
recognize the value that trademark

quent use of characters on merchandise, those selling authorized merchandise depicting famous characters may be hurt financially by unau-

owners
marks:

thorized merchandise.

build into their famous
"[T]he trademark owner,
who has spent the time and investment needed to build up the goodwill
in these marks, should be the sole
determinant of how the marks are

mercial assets owned by Time
Warner, those of us employed to protect them consider ourselves trustees
18 7
of national treasures."

TOMORROW NEVER DIES

Rmous characters are more than
just part of a story; some take on
lives of their own. But even the man
of steel would not survive if appropriated for widespread public use.

Brothers Film Studio, testified on
behalf of Time Warner's affiliated
companies, including DC Comics and
Warner Brothers Television, producers of such shows as ER and

used in a commercial sense." 18 1 He
gave examples of counterfeit T-shirts
depicting Bugs Bunny and the For this reason, characters have
Tasmanian Devil smoking marijua- always received the highest levels of
na. Without a likelihood of confu- intellectual property protection, by a
sion, which was doubtful in a case combination of copyright and tradelike this, Montan said character own-, mark security. In most cases, these
ers needed some additional way to traditional forms of protection still
protect their marks. 18 2 He echoed suffice. But, in the sea of electronic
the oft-cited fact that state dilution commerce where copiers sometimes
statutes were inadequate and incon- escape infringement and enforceHe observed ment, the expansion of copyright prosistently applied. 1 83

Friends.1 76 According to Montan,
the Time Warner Companies "enthusiastically endorse[d]" the proposed
First,
dilution amendment. 1 7 7

that most state courts would have
great difficulty granting state law
injunctions that apply outside state
boundaries - thus offering little pro-

tection is not the only answer. A
more effective solution already exists
in the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act. This Act extends already exist-

Montan spoke of the need to protect
authorized, licensed users of the
He noted that Warner
mark.
Brothers' consumer products division

tection to characters known on a
national scale. 184

ing trademark protection to an elite
category of marks deserving of speTheir status as
cial protection.
national treasures supports the

At committee hearings prior to the

passage of the dilution statute, owners of some famous creative characters spoke out in support of this extra
protection. 17 5 Nils Victor Montan,
vice president and senior intellectual
Warner
for
property counsel

had about 2,300 active licenses, and
pointed out that these licensees
looked to Warner Brothers and DC
Comics to protect these marks and
prevent others from using them
Thus,
without authorization. 1 7 8
dilution protection would benefit
Time Warner, its licensees, the
employees of licensees, manufacturers of licensed clothing, and retailers
17 9
who sell authorized products.
Montan
JOURNAL

cited
article

a

WALL

STREET

discussing

the

impact of the Hollywood licensing
industry on the American economy,
and concluded that laws like the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act
"ultimately put money into the pock-

Fnally, Montan described how
Warner Brothers and DC Comics had
invested money and effort to build
such characters as Bugs Bunny,
and
Batman,
Duck,
Daffy
185
Due to such efforts,
Superman.
these characters now instantaneously convey a wealth of information
about the products on which they
appear, including affiliation and high
quality. 18 6 With this, Montan identified the most compelling reason for
guarding James Bond, Mickey
Mouse, and the whole cast of famous
characters: the need to protect them
from diffusion and public disgrace.
"These trademarks have become
classic pieces of Americana," Montan
stated, "and although they are com-

application of this doctrine to famous
characters and justifies the limited
property right this doctrine confers.
At its very core, the federal copyright
system was created to benefit the
public. Federal dilution protection
can further this goal by preserving
the integrity of favorite characters
for all to enjoy.
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